



A Reassessment of Seismic Hazards and Risk at Nuclear Power Plants in the U.S.: An NRC Perspective

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Outline

- Background and Regulatory Framework
- Generic Issue 199
- Fukushima Task Force
- Implementation
- Summary

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Background


- Significant advancements in our understanding of seismic hazard processes have occurred since the existing fleet of reactors was licensed.
- New data has been acquired and models have been developed in the past 30+ years that suggest significant differences in assumptions relative to those used in licensing of existing fleet.
- Evaluation of the impact of these changes on plant safety is not straightforward.



Applicable Regulations (pre-1997)

- **10 CFR 100.10(c)(1) and Appendix A establish the seismic design basis (Safe Shutdown Earthquake-SSE) for plants licensed before January 10, 1997 (i.e., currently operating plants):**
 - **Based on a review of earthquakes that have occurred nearby the site**
 - **A deterministic approach- no specification of frequency of occurrence**
 - **Different approach than probabilistic seismic hazard assessment (PSHA)**
- 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria (GDC-2) and similar principle design criteria require that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena without loss of capability to perform their safety functions:
 - **Appropriate consideration of the most severe of the natural phenomena that have been historically reported for the site and surrounding area**
 - **Include sufficient margin for the limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time in which the historical data have been accumulated**
- No requirement for periodic reassessment of the seismic design basis.

Safe Shutdown Earthquake -SSE (Ground Motion)



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Applicable Regulations (post-1997)

- 10 CFR 50, 100.23 and Appendix S establish the seismic design basis for plants licensed after January 10, 1997:
 - Appendix S defines SSE as “Safe-shutdown earthquake ground motion is the vibratory ground motion for which certain structures, systems, and components must be designed to remain functional”
 - 10 CFR Part 100.23 “Geologic and Seismic Siting Criteria” requires that the applicant determine the SSE **and its uncertainty**, the potential for surface tectonic and nontectonic deformations.
- Regulatory Guide 1.208 provides guidance on satisfying 10 CFR Part 100.23, by performing a probabilistic seismic hazard assessment (**PSHA**). Determine (ground motion response spectrum-GMRS) SSE using the performance-based approach. Specifies target frequencies of exceedance linked to performance goals.
 - Different approach than deterministic Appendix A process:
 - **PSHA is a major input to seismic risk evaluation using SPRA or SMA**
- No requirement for periodic reassessment of the seismic design basis.

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
Comparisons of GMRS with SSE

- Staff compared the ground motion response spectrum (GMRS) from Early Site Permits (North Anna, Clinton, Grand Gulf) with SSEs for co-located operating units
- Comparison resulted in initiation of **Generic Issue-199** (“*Implications of Updated Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Estimates in Central and Eastern United States on Existing Plants*”)
- Comparisons with subsequent applications (COLs and ESPs) confirmed initial observations

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


GI-199: Observations From Early Site Permit Reviews





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Example Seismic Hazard Curves: PSHA Output



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Risk Metric: Computing Seismic Core Damage Frequency (SCDF)



Over a small range of accelerations, the SCDF contribution is the product of:

- The frequency of earthquakes with accelerations in the range, and
- The probability of core damage given acceleration within the range

Add up the contributions over all accelerations.

$$SCDF = \int_0^{\infty} P(a) \left(-\frac{dH(a)}{da} \right) da$$

$$= \int_0^{\infty} H(a) \frac{dP(a)}{da} da$$

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GI-199 History

- Accepted into Generic Issues Program (GIP) (2005)
- Screened to Safety/Risk Assessment portion of GIP (2007)
- Safety/Risk Assessment completed (2010)
- Public meetings held, transfer from RES to NRR (2011)
- Draft Generic Letter issued, public comments received (2011)
- Subsumed into Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 (2012)



Fukushima: Background

- NRC established Near Term Task Force (NTTF) in response to accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant
- NTTF developed a set of recommendations
- SECY-11-0124 identified recommendations to be taken without unnecessary delay
 - Three 10 CFR 50.54(f) information requests
 - Seismic and Flooding Design (R2.1 and R2.3)
 - Emergency Preparedness (R9.3)



Overall Approach: **Recommendation 2.1**

- NTTF Recommendation 2.1 implemented in two phases
 - Phase 1: Licensees *reevaluate* seismic hazard **using present-day regulatory guidance and methodologies** and, if necessary, perform a risk assessment
 - Phase 2: Based on results of Phase 1, NRC will determine if further regulatory actions are necessary to protect against updated hazard

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NTTF Recommendations: **Scope**

R 2.1: Seismic Hazard Reevaluation


- Determine Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS) for Site
 - Use Probabilistic Method (PSHA)
 - Seismic Source Models
 - **(CEUS-SSC Model for 96 Plants)**
 - **Site-Specific for WUS**
 - Seismic Ground Motion Models
 - Site Response Evaluation (Site-Specific)
 - Follow SSHAC Guidelines
- Compare GMRS with Safe Shutdown Earthquake Plant (SSE) Spectrum

R 2.3: Perform Seismic Walkdowns

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Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC)



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


SSHAC Process Objectives

- Create reproducible, stable estimates of probabilistic seismic hazard at a site. This provides greater regulatory assurance.
- Obtain this stability by:
 - Evaluation: Considering the data, models, and methods of the larger technical community
 - Integration: Building models that represent the center, body, and range of technically defensible interpretations.
- Assess uncertainties in the input data and quantify uncertainties in the results.



Recommendation 2.1: Seismic



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NTTF Recommendation 2.1 and 2.3 Schedules

- Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Hazard Reevaluation
 - Complete Phase 1 including hazard and risk evaluations within 4 to 7 years (accelerated for plants in the CEUS)
 - Complete High-Priority Plants within 5 years

- Recommendation 2.3 (Seismic Walkdowns)
 - Complete within approximately 1 year

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
Summary

- Significant advancements in our understanding of seismic hazard processes have occurred since the existing fleet of reactors was licensed
- Potential issues associated with these changes in state-of-knowledge have been known for some time.
- Proposed process for NTTF Recommendation 2.1 utilizing current regulatory framework provides a risk-informed method to evaluate the potential safety significance of these changes.
- This will provide relatively transparent “linkage” to NTTF Recommendation 2.2 which requires periodic re-assessment of natural hazards.



Background/Discussion Slides

Input Models for PSHA





SSC
Seismic Source
Characterization

GMC
Ground Motion
Characterization

**Hazard
Calculations**

Reiter (1990)

Example Soil Amplification Functions




Needed for GI-199 Regulatory Analysis


- Updated site specific hazard curves
- Frequency dependent, site specific amplification functions
- Plant level fragility information
- Plant specific contributors to seismic risk
 - Can be produced for plants with seismic PRA
 - Will need method developed for plants with SMA
- Need repeatable approach for evaluating new seismic hazard information being developed

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Determination of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)





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Seismic Source

- Unique seismic sources are defined for PSHA to account for distinct differences in the following criteria:
 - Earthquake recurrence rate
 - Maximum earthquake magnitude
 - Expected future earthquake characteristics (e.g., style of faulting, depth distribution)
 - Probability of activity of tectonic feature(s)
- CEUS SSC methodology attempts to work through the criteria sequentially and logically
 - Each criterion adds complexity to the seismic source model
 - Each criterion is only applied if its application would lead to hazard-significant changes in the model



Map of the CEUS SSC Project catalog showing earthquakes of uniform moment magnitude E[M] 2.9 and larger. Colored symbols denote earthquakes not contained in the USGS seismic hazard mapping catalog.

